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NOTES
YOU MUST BE THIS QUALIFIED TO OFFER AN
OPINION: PERMITTING LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS TO TESTIFY AS LAYPERSONS UNDER
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 701
Kim Channick*
Every day, in courtrooms across the United States, law enforcement
officers testify in criminal and civil trials. Often an officer is certified as an
expert witness and, accordingly, can provide opinions to the court based on
his or her law enforcement expertise. Other times, the officer offers
testimony as a layperson. In the latter situation, Federal Rule of Evidence
701 controls the officer’s lay opinion testimony. This Rule was first
adopted to remedy a problematic common law practice of universally
prohibiting lay opinion testimony. As the Rule stands now, all lay
witnesses, including law enforcement officers, must limit their opinions to
ones that are based on their personal perceptions and that are helpful to the
fact-finder.
Courts, however, are split regarding where to draw the line when lay
officers are asked to provide lay opinion testimony about an investigation.
In particular, courts have disagreed over the question of when a lay officer
may provide opinion testimony about the meaning of recorded phone calls.
This Note explores the three approaches the federal circuit courts take to
this question. To resolve the split, this Note suggests that an amended
version of the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits’ approaches be adopted.
These circuits hold that officers’ lay opinion testimony must be restricted to
instances of true first-hand knowledge to ensure that jurors are not
prejudiced by unqualified and unhelpful testimony.
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INTRODUCTION
We have all recounted hilarious or dramatic events that fell flat as stories.
Sometimes “you had to be there,”1 and the retelling does not quite capture
the moment. Indeed, many life experiences can be difficult to fully recreate

1. United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 2005).

2013] YOU MUST BE THIS QUALIFIED TO OFFER AN OPINION 3441
solely with words. Yet we often ask witnesses to do just that: use facts
alone to convey complex scenarios and experiences.
In our system, the jury or the judge, sitting as fact-finder, decides
questions of fact.2 To assist in the proper determination of disputed facts,
plaintiffs and defendants provide the fact-finder with concrete evidence.
Simultaneously, courts police this evidence, enforcing procedural and
evidentiary rules that act to maintain fair and nonprejudicial trials. Witness
testimony is one main way that the fact-finder obtains information about the
situation in question. Although witnesses are generally required to speak in
terms of facts,3 the reality that sometimes “you had to be there” often means
that witnesses are unable to provide an explanation of a situation with facts
alone. Thus, under the right circumstances, witnesses—both lay and
expert—are permitted to provide opinions or make inferential statements
that will enable the witness to paint the most accurate possible picture of the
situation.4
While in some instances allowing lay witnesses to offer opinions will
better convey the “whole story,” this practice can also raise concerns about
invading the province of the jury5 or opening the door to otherwise
inadmissible evidence.6 Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which dictates the
admissibility of lay opinion testimony, limits the circumstances when
laypersons may offer opinions in order to avoid exactly these types of
concerns.7 Under Rule 701, lay opinion testimony must be (a) “rationally
based on the witness’s perception,” (b) “helpful to clearly understanding the
witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue,” and (c) “not based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of
Rule 702.”8 While some lay opinion testimony will unquestionably satisfy
these requirements, other testimony presents harder questions of
admissibility, testing the boundaries of the Rule.
This Note will explore the issues that Rule 701 raises by examining how
opinion testimony restrictions are applied to the testimony of law
enforcement officers in criminal cases. In these cases, law enforcement
officers may possess knowledge of the various investigation methods that
were used, the people involved, and the essential timeline of the
investigation process. Frequently, testimony about these matters is relevant
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 671 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “fact-finder” as “[o]ne or
more persons—such as jurors in a trial or administrative-law judges in a hearing—who hear
testimony and review evidence to rule on a factual issue”).
3. See 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 11, at 56 (6th ed. 2006).
4. See FED. R. EVID. 701.
5. See 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6253, at 109–10 (1997).
6. See United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the
appellant argued that the lay opinion testimony allowed the prosecution to admit otherwise
inadmissible hearsay); Mary Morton, Note, The Hearsay Rule and Epistemological Suicide,
74 GEO. L.J. 1301, 1305 (1986) (arguing that the lay opinion rule makes it impossible to ban
all hearsay).
7. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (1975 adoption).
8. FED. R. EVID. 701.
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and admissible as based on personal perception. Questions begin to arise,
however, when law enforcement officers are asked to testify beyond the
strict boundaries of their personal perception to help the fact-finder
overcome that “you had to be there” feeling.
At times, such officers are certified as experts under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and may provide opinion testimony based on both experience
with the case in question and knowledge obtained in the course of their law
enforcement career.9 In other situations, law enforcement officers are not
qualified as experts but are permitted to offer lay opinion testimony under
Rule 701.10 The reasons for eliciting lay opinion testimony, rather than
qualifying the officer as an expert, vary. Sometimes the officer cannot meet
the requirements of Rule 702, which were established in the seminal case
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.11 In other cases, it may be
more efficient to use lay opinion.
Whatever the reason, the decision to offer lay opinion testimony of law
enforcement officers gives rise to several vexing and recurring questions.
When does a law enforcement lay witness possess enough personal
knowledge to provide opinions about various aspects of a case? What kind
of testimony do we want the jury to hear from these witnesses? The
purpose of testimony is to provide the fact-finder with information that is
helpful to deciding the facts of the case. Does allowing a law enforcement
officer who has investigated a case to provide his opinion about certain
pieces of evidence or the case as a whole accomplish this goal or merely
substitute the jury’s assessment of the evidence with the law enforcement
officer’s assessment?
This Note addresses the three-way circuit split regarding whether lay
opinion testimony is admissible under Rule 701 for law enforcement
officers who testify regarding an investigation of which they only have
general and often after-the-fact knowledge.

9. Rule 702 reads as follows:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of
the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Brian R. Gallini, To Serve and Protect? Officers As Expert
Witnesses in Federal Drug Prosecutions, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 373 (2012)
(describing the application of Rule 702 to a law enforcement officer testifying as an expert
regarding code words in a drug transaction); Anne Bowen Poulin, Experience-Based
Opinion Testimony: Strengthening the Lay Opinion Rule, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 551, 554 (2012)
(“Law enforcement officers are routinely permitted to testify as experts based on their law
enforcement experience.”).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1102 (11th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 1213, 1221–22 (10th Cir. 2007).
11. 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993).
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The cases analyzed in this Note consider this question by examining Rule
701(a), Rule 701(b), or, in some instances, both. Courts that focus on Rule
701(a)’s requirement that lay opinion testimony be “rationally based on the
witness’s perception,”12 consider the nature of the witness’s relationship
with the situation in question.13 These courts discuss, either directly or
indirectly, whether the witness’s personal experience with the evidence
rises to the level of “first-hand knowledge or observation.”14 Courts that
instead focus on Rule 701(b)’s requirement that lay opinion testimony be
“helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining
a fact in issue,”15 consider whether the witness’s supposed personal
knowledge contributes any useful information to the jury’s understanding of
the case.16 While circuit courts discuss the issue in different ways, the
underlying inquiry is the same. Courts ask whether the lay witness’s
knowledge of the situation enhances the fact-finder’s ability to properly
decide the case.
Part I of this Note will provide background information about Rule 701.
This includes a discussion of the Rule’s common law origins, the adoption
of the Rule, the meaning of the Rule’s three requirements, and the Rule’s
real-world applications. Part II will explain the conflict among the circuits
regarding nonexpert law enforcement officers providing opinion testimony
about investigations. Finally, Part III will argue that, while the jury should
have access to the information it needs to make an accurate decision, this
information should be meaningfully limited to exclude unqualified and
unhelpful testimony that invades the province of the jury.

12. FED. R. EVID. 701(a).
13. See, e.g., Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103; United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 292–
93 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 831–32 (7th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 902, 904–05 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Garcia,
413 F.3d 201, 211–12 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 641 (8th Cir.
2001).
14. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note. Courts often disfavor the use of
legislative history for a variety of reasons. See Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the Federal
Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes, 28 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1283, 1284–87 (1995). However, some scholars have suggested that the Advisory
Committee notes for the Federal Rules of Evidence do not have the same problems as other
forms of legislative history and, therefore, should be given considerable weight. See Edward
W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908, 913
(1978) (“[The Advisory Committee notes] must be taken to represent the thinking of
[Congress] as the equivalent of a committee report effectively serving as the basis of
legislation.”); Scallen, supra, at 1287–93 (discussing the “[s]pecial [q]uality of the Advisory
Committee and [i]ts [n]otes”). Many courts interpreting Rule 701 seem to agree with this
assessment, as several of the cases analyzed in this Note make specific reference to Rule
701’s Advisory Committee note. See, e.g., Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1120–21; Garcia, 413 F.3d
at 211; Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641 n.3. These continued references to the Advisory Committee
note suggest that courts agree with and follow the Advisory Committee’s interpretation of
Rule 701.
15. FED. R. EVID. 701(a).
16. See, e.g., Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103; United States v. Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 1213,
1221–22 (10th Cir. 2007); Garcia, 413 F.3d at 210.
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I. FROM COMMON LAW TO RULE 701: THE EVOLUTION OF
LAY OPINION TESTIMONY IN THE UNITED STATES
Part I of this Note outlines the evolution of lay testimony in the American
court system. Part I.A focuses on the common law’s dismissal of lay
opinion testimony, as well as the problems the common law approach
created. Part I.B examines the rejection of the common law approach and
the adoption of Rule 701. Part I.C analyzes the three provisions of Rule
701, highlighting how the Rule is commonly interpreted. Part I.D.
addresses the critiques of Rule 701 and the responses to these critiques.
Finally, Part I.E provides an overview of the most common uses of Rule
701.
A. Common Law Lay Testimony
Under Rule 701, lay witnesses—witnesses not qualified as experts—are
allowed to offer opinion or inferential testimony when they possess certain
personal knowledge of the situation in question and when the nature of the
testimony is such that opinions or inferences provide something of value to
the trier of fact.17
However, at common law, lay testimony differed significantly from the
admissible lay testimony of today.18 Despite providing the origins for the
American opinion rule, British courts were markedly less restrictive of
opinion testimony than their American counterparts, allowing lay witnesses
to offer opinions that were based on personal knowledge.19 Conversely, at
common law, the American court system did not permit lay witnesses to
provide opinions.20 Instead, laypersons were allowed to relate only facts, or
as one judge explained, state that which “they had seen, heard, felt, smelled,
tasted, or done.”21 This restrictive approach to lay testimony stemmed from

17. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1741 (defining “lay witness” as “[a]
witness who does not testify as an expert and who is therefore restricted to giving an opinion
or making an inference that (1) is based on firsthand knowledge, and (2) is helpful in
clarifying the testimony or in determining facts”).
18. See Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1195–99 (3d Cir.
1995) (providing a general history of the evolution of lay opinion testimony and explaining
that Rule 701 demonstrates “a movement away from the courts’ historically skeptical view
of lay opinion evidence”).
19. See 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 51–52; Herman Edgar Garner, Jr., Comment,
Opinion and Expert Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 36 LA. L. REV. 123, 124 (1975).
20. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. 612, 618 (1884) (explaining that
impression and opinion testimony of nonexpert witnesses regarding sanity are inadmissible,
even where the witness provides rationales for the statements); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A
DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 141 n.1 (George Chase ed., 2d ed. 1912) (“It is a general
rule that witnesses must give evidence of facts, not of opinions.”); see also Asplundh Mfg.
Div., 57 F.3d at 1195 (noting that common law lay witnesses were not allowed to “draw
conclusions which could be characterized as opinion testimony”); Charles R. Richey,
Proposals To Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the Use of the Word “Expert” Under the
Federal Rules Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury Trials, 154 F.R.D. 537, 542 (1994).
21. Richey, supra note 20, at 542; see also Asplundh Mfg. Div., 57 F.3d at 1195 (quoting
Judge Richey’s explanation of lay opinion testimony at common law).
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a general skepticism toward the reliability of laypersons’ opinions,22 as well
as a belief that it was the jury’s job to form opinions, not the witnesses’.23
Further, the common law lay testimony rule relied on the misguided
principle that facts and opinions are “readily distinguishable.”24 In practice,
however, this distinction is not easily made,25 as any recollection of facts is
in some way “the product of inference as well as observation and
memory.”26 The following is an example of the way in which even
seemingly factual testimony is actually full of inferential and opinion-based
statements:
A jury trial. A witness, on direct examination, is describing an
automobile accident:
Q. What happened then?
A. The lady in the car that got hit stumbled out of her car and fell in a
faint.
Defense counsel: Move to strike the opinions of the witness. Let him
state the facts.

22. See 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 212 (1926) (“[T]he judge is
to give an absolute sentence, and therefore ought to have more sure ground than thinking.”
(quoting Adams v. Canon, (1622) 73 Eng. Rep. 117 (K.B.) 118 n.15) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Richey, supra note 20, at 542; see also Asplundh Mfg. Div., 57 F.3d at
1195.
23. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 524 (1898).
24. 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 53 (arguing that the “basic assumption” behind the
distinction between fact and opinion “is an illusion”); see also 3 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET
AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 701.02, at 701-4 (10th ed. 2011) (discussing
“[t]he [v]ague [d]istinction [b]etween [o]pinion and [f]act”); 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 1919, at 112 (2d ed. 1923) (arguing that when it comes to distinguishing facts from opinion
“no such distinction is scientifically possible”). Famous evidence scholar John Henry
Wigmore was quite vocal in his general distaste for the common law opinion rule, asserting
that the rule was “developed with a[] . . . peculiar rigidity and stolid disregard of practical
consequences.” Id. § 1929, at 123. Moreover, Wigmore prophesized that “the [o]pinion rule
will in substance disappear.” Id. § 1929, at 124. Judge Learned Hand shared Wigmore’s
disapproval of the opinion rule, calling it “the most annoying rule in its application that I
know.” Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials To Reach the Heart of the Matter, in
3 LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 89, 98 (1926).
25. See FED R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (“[T]he practical impossibility of
determinating by rule what is a ‘fact,’ demonstrated by a century of litigation of the question
of what is a fact for purposes of pleading under the Field Code, extends into evidence
also.”); H. Patrick Furman, Opinion Testimony: Lay, Expert, or Something Else?, 37 COLO.
LAW. 33, 33 (2008) (discussing the problem of distinguishing “fact” from “opinion”).
26. 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 53; see also WILLARD L. KING & DOUGLASS
PILLINGER, A STUDY OF THE LAW OF OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS 8 (1942) (“The American
courts have had a great struggle with a rule which appeared to require them to admit
statements of fact and exclude all inferences of the witness. Such a rule is quite impossible
of application: all statements contain inferences.”); JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE:
COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 24 (1947) (concluding that, at least in part, all
“assertions are opinions”); THAYER, supra note 23, at 524 (“In a sense all testimony to matter
of fact is opinion evidence; i. e., it is a conclusion formed from phenomena and mental
impressions.”).
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The Court: Strike them out. The jury will disregard that answer. [To the
witness:] You must state the facts and not your conclusions regarding
them. You can’t give the jury your opinion as to which car got hit, whose
car it was, how the lady got out of the car or why she fell, if she did
fall,—you must state the facts.27

Judge Learned Hand provided a famous and eloquent criticism of the
common law lay opinion rule, stating that “[t]he line between opinion and
fact is at best only one of degree.”28
The impossibility of definitively distinguishing facts from opinions
created two main problems for common law lay testimony. First, when
relating factual situations, witnesses struggled to omit all opinion-based or
inferential language, as this type of language naturally permeates witnesses’
efforts to provide a detailed description of a situation.29 Accordingly, lay
witnesses often unwittingly overstepped the line between fact and opinion,
making the process of lay witnesses testifying an exceedingly difficult
one.30
A lay witness who is asked to explain how an individual reacted to a
situation would most naturally respond that the individual was mad, sad,
happy, etc. Under the common law rule, however, a witness was not
allowed to state the emotion he or she reasonably inferred the individual to
be experiencing.31 Instead, the witness would need to provide a list of
physical characteristics to demonstrate the individual’s emotions.32 For
example, instead of testifying that a person appeared angry, common law
lay witnesses were required to state that person had a furrowed brow or a
red face.33
Second, the common law lay testimony rule also created the problem of
endless litigation over the question of whether testimony constituted fact or

27. KING & PILLINGER, supra note 26, at 1.
28. Cent. R. Co. of N.J. v. Monahan, 11 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1926); see also Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 168 (1988) (repeating Judge Hand’s remark
regarding the difference between facts and opinions).
29. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (emphasizing the struggle
witnesses experienced when attempting to speak without any opinions or inferences); United
States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 211 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that often it is difficult for
witnesses “to describe the appearance or relationship of persons, the atmosphere of a place,
or the value of an object by reference only to objective facts”).
30. See Cent. R. Co., 11 F.2d at 214 (observing that “the witness cannot comply [with
the common law lay witness rule], since, like most men, he is unaware of the extent to which
inference enters into his perceptions”); Hand, supra note 24, at 97–98 (1926) (“I know of [no
rule] more baffling to a witness, who has been accustomed to proceed exactly in that fashion
in proving his points outside of court.”); see also Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor
Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1195 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Judge Hand’s criticism regarding the
unnecessary difficulty the common law lay witness rule placed on witnesses).
31. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 1917, at 101 (explaining that, at common law,
judges frequently would say to a witness “we want what you know, not what you think or
believe” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
32. 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 24, § 701.02, at 701-5.
33. See id.
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opinion,34 a distinction that proved impossible to determine consistently.35
Wigmore explained that the attempt to distinguish facts from opinions did
“more than any one rule of procedure to reduce our litigation towards a
state of legalized gambling.”36
Despite the procedural problems that the common law rule created,
courts were slow to abandon the strict opinion-fact distinction.37 Initially
the rule was only relaxed in extreme cases of necessity.38 Over time,
however, concerns about the functionality of the lay witness rule
increased.39 Additionally, the American court system experienced a
“general liberalization” of all evidentiary rules that acted to keep evidence
from the fact-finder.40
B. The Adoption of Rule 701
In 1975, given the problems experienced under the common law opinion
rule, Rule 701 was adopted.41 The adoption of Rule 701, however, did not
represent a sudden shift in preference from factual testimony to opinion
testimony. Even under Rule 701, witnesses are still encouraged to provide
testimony in the form of facts as often as possible.42 The continued
34. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (addressing the century spent
litigating the difference between facts and opinions); Asplundh Mfg. Div., 57 F.3d at 1195
(noting the “numerous appeals” that resulted from the strict fact-opinion distinction);
2 EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 195–96 (1954) (stating that the bar
on lay opinion testimony resulted in “many foolish reversals and still more foolish appeals”).
35. See 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 7:1,
at 748 (3d ed. 2007) (describing the inadmissibility of lay opinion testimony as a
“mischievous . . . instrument of review”); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 1929, at 124 (arguing
that the common law opinion rule was in part problematic because of “the utter impossibility
of a consistent application of the rule, and the consequent uncertainty of the law”).
36. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 1929, at 124.
37. See 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 53.
38. See Grismore v. Consol. Prods. Co., 5 N.W.2d 646, 655 (Iowa 1942) (finding that
opinions are admissible in the case of necessity); Balt. & O. R. Co. v. Schultz, 1 N.E. 324,
332 (Ohio 1885) (finding that lay witnesses may give opinions only where the opinion is
“necessary to the due administration of justice” and provides material information about the
issue in question); Graham v. Pa. Co., 21 A. 151, 153 (Pa. 1891) (concluding that, where
facts are sufficient to describe a situation, opinions will be inadmissible); 2 MORGAN, supra
note 34, at 191 (using Rule 401 of the American Law Institute’s Model Code—which states
that a witness may not offer opinion if “the witness can readily and with equal accuracy and
adequacy communicate what he has perceived to the trier of fact without testifying in terms
of inferences or stating inferences”—to demonstrate the then-current state of opinion
testimony); see also 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 53–54.
39. See Asplundh Mfg. Div., 57 F.3d at 1195.
40. Id.
41. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL
STUDENT EDITION § 10.02[1], at 10-9 (9th ed. 2011); D. Garrison Hill, Lay Witness
Opinions, 19 S.C. LAW. 34, 36 (2007) (“With the adoption of the Federal Rule of Evidence
701 in 1972, the federal courts retreated from their longstanding hostility towards lay
opinion evidence.”).
42. See 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 56; 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35,
§ 7:2, at 749 (arguing that the conditions put on lay testimony under Rule 701 represent “a
mild rule of preference” that usually lay witnesses should testify with facts and not opinions
or inferences).
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emphasis on facts over opinions reflects the ultimate goal of all evidence,
which is to provide the fact-finder with the best information and details
upon which an independent opinion can be formed.43
When Rule 701 was initially adopted in 1975 it contained the following
language:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a
clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue.44

Soon after the Rule was adopted, the desirability of refinement became
evident. Following the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, both lay
witnesses, under Rule 701,45 and expert witnesses, under Rule 702,46 were
permitted to give opinions.47 This eliminated the fundamental advantage of
offering a witness as an expert.48 Moreover, under the original version of
Rule 701, attorneys often had significant discretion to determine whether to
offer an experienced witness as an expert or as a layperson,49 as some
courts allowed opinion testimony “based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge”50 under Rule 701, viewing the distinction between
Rule 701 and Rule 702 with general indifference.51
At times, lawyers chose to admit a witness as a layperson in order to
avoid special procedural barriers placed on expert witnesses.52 Laypersons
were not required to go through “expert-discovery obligations” and, further,
did not experience the same scrutiny of their reliability that judges often
inflicted upon expert witnesses.53

43. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (“The rule retains the traditional
objective of putting the trier of fact in possession of an accurate reproduction of the event.”);
1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 56; 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, § 7:1, at 747,
§ 7.2, at 749–50; Garner, supra note 19, at 123 (highlighting the strong emphasis the
American court system has placed on providing the fact-finder with the “best evidence
possible” to determine an issue).
44. FED. R. EVID. 701 (1975) (subsequently amended).
45. FED. R. EVID. 701.
46. FED. R. EVID. 702.
47. PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 502 (3d ed. 2012).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 501.
50. FED. R. EVID. 701.
51. See, e.g., Greenwood Ranches, Inc. v. Skie Constr. Co., 629 F.2d 518, 522 (8th Cir.
1980) (allowing ranch operator-owner to testify as a lay witness to the value of crops); S.
Cent. Livestock Dealers, Inc. v. Sec. State Bank of Hedley, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061–62 (5th
Cir. 1980) (permitting the financial officer for a feedlot to testify about the value of the
feedlot’s assets and liabilities as a layman under Rule 701 and as an expert under Rule 702);
see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 47, at 503; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 41,
§ 10.02[2][c], at 10-14.
52. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 47, at 502.
53. Id.
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However, two important Supreme Court cases in the 1990s, Daubert54
and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael55 increased the standards for expert
testimony, requiring that the reliability of an expert’s methods be tested
prior to admission.56 Accordingly, in 2000, the language of Rule 701 and
Rule 702 was amended, both to codify the standards that the Supreme Court
set for expert testimony57 and to prevent “proffering an expert in lay
witness clothing.”58
Under the new Rules, parties should not be able to avoid either the
reliability requirements of Rule 70259 or “the expert witness pretrial
disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.”60
C. Interpreting the Provisions of Rule 701
This part explores the three provisions of Rule 701, explaining how each
plays a part in the functioning of the Rule and the restricting of lay opinion
testimony. This part highlights both the interpretations of Rule 701 that
enjoy general acceptance, as well the interpretations that have received a
mixed reception.
The current version of Rule 701 reads as follows:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an
opinion is limited to one that is:
(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to
determine a fact in issue; and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702.61

Notably, while the sections below attempt to explain the meaning of each
prong of Rule 701, the Rule provides judges with significant discretion to
determine what constitutes admissible lay opinion testimony.62

54. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
55. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
56. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert
Testimony: A Partial Answer to the Questions Left Unresolved by Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 52 ME. L. REV. 19, 20–23 (2000); Poulin, supra note 9, at 558–59.
57. See Poulin, supra note 9, at 559.
58. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (2000 amendment).
59. Id.; see also 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS
§ 701.03[4][b], at 701-31 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2013) (explaining that the
reliability requirement of Rule 702 stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert).
60. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[4][b], at 701-31 (citing FED. R.
CIV. P. 26; FED. R. CRIM. P. 16).
61. FED. R. EVID. 701. This version of Rule 701 also reflects amendments that were
made to the Rule in 2011. However, the changes made to the Rule in 2011 were purely
stylistic in nature and were not intended to have any effect on the practical application of the
Rule. See id. advisory committee’s note (2011 amendment).
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1. Rule 701(a) and the Requirement That Testimony Be Rationally
Based on the Witness’s Perception
In analyzing the meaning of Rule 701(a), it is more accurate to separate
the provision into two distinct requirements.63 First, 701(a) requires that
lay opinion testimony be based on the “witness’s perception.”64 Second,
the witness’s testimony must be “rationally based” on this perception.65
Rule 701’s Advisory Committee note characterizes a “witness’s
perception” as “the familiar requirement of first-hand knowledge or
observation.”66 The requirement that a witness testify based on first-hand
knowledge, otherwise referred to as personal knowledge, is not unique to
Rule 701 and, in fact, finds its origins in medieval law.67 Moreover,
personal knowledge also appears in Rule 602, which requires that all
layperson testimony, whether expressing an opinion or not, be founded in
personal knowledge.68
The emphasis on personal knowledge stems from “the law’s usual
preference that decisions be based on the best evidence available.”69 Some
distortion occurs each time the events of an incident are retold; thus making
testimony directly from the person who perceived the incident the most
reliable version.70 Moreover, where a layperson is offering an opinion,
courts want to be sure that the individual rests his assertion upon a
“competent foundation.”71
What it means to possess “first-hand knowledge” of something is not
entirely clear. Indeed, this question lies at the heart of this Note’s inquiry.72
However, despite the difficulty of determining the outer bounds of first-

62. 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6253, at 116 (“By leaving the concepts of
opinion and inference undefined, the drafters bestowed upon the courts considerable
discretion to determine the scope of Rule 701.”).
63. See Poulin, supra note 9, at 560 (explaining that Rule 701 can be divided into “four
hurdles”).
64. FED. R. EVID. 701.
65. Id.
66. Id. advisory committee’s note.
67. See 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 52 (“The early courts demanded that witnesses
speak only ‘what they see and hear.’”).
68. FED. R. EVID. 602. (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony. This
rule does not apply to a witness’s expert testimony under Rule 703.”); see also 3 MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, § 7:2, at 750, § 7:3, at 751.
69. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 602.02[1], at 602-3; see also 1 BROUN,
supra note 3, § 10, at 47 (common law emphasized the “most reliable sources”); Dale A.
Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 227 (1988) (going beyond the
requirement of original documents, Nance argues that principles of evidence dictate that
parties should always offer the court “the best evidence reasonably available on a litigated
factual issue”).
70. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 602.02[1], at 602-3.
71. Garner, supra note 19, at 126.
72. See infra Part II.
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hand knowledge, there are several forms of first-hand knowledge that are
generally accepted as sufficient to satisfy Rule 701(a).
First, the actual “observations of [an] event or situation” clearly fall
within the definition of first-hand knowledge.73 In these situations, lay
opinion testimony is often described as little more than a shorthand account
of a situation74 where the witness is able to give useful and descriptive
inferential statements instead of reciting exhaustive, detailed facts.75
Similarly, a witness’s perception may also be based on a collection “of
personal observations over time.”76
Courts also often admit lay opinion testimony that is based on the
witness’s first-hand perception of the incident in question coupled with
background knowledge obtained “through earlier personal observations.”77
Some courts take Rule 701 even further, allowing witnesses to provide
73. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[1], at 701-5.
74. See Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1196 (3d Cir.
1995); 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 54; 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59,
§ 701.03[1], at 701-5.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Rodríguez-Vélez, 597 F.3d 32, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2010)
(admitting lay opinion testimony that the defendant and two others “had the strongest say” in
staffing a drug surveillance tower, when the testimony was given by a witness who had
participated in the narcotic conspiracy in question); United States v. Lane, 591 F.3d 921, 926
(7th Cir. 2010) (finding that an officer who searched the defendant’s home could provide an
opinion about which bedroom the defendant lived in); United States v. Yannotti, 541 F.3d
112, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding the admittance of a co-conspirator’s lay opinion
testimony about the meaning of his accomplice’s words in an intercepted phone call).
76. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[1], at 701-6.1 to -7; see, e.g.,
United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 168, 179 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010) (allowing a former gang
member to testify to the effects an act of violence generally would have on a gang member’s
status); United States v. Holmes, 229 F.3d 782, 788–89 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that six
meetings with the defendant, lasting at least thirty minutes each, formed a sufficient basis for
the lay witness to offer an opinion about whether the defendant was the individual in bank
surveillance photographs); United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 1504, 1518 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that lay witnesses were allowed to give their opinions about the sheriff’s political
power, when the testimony was based on extensive experience with the sheriff over a
considerable period of time).
77. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[1], at 701-7; see, e.g., United States
v. Gaines, 170 F.3d 72, 76–78 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding the trial court’s admission of lay
opinion testimony proper, where the witness opined about the meaning of recorded calls in
which the witness participated); Haun v. Ideal Indus. Inc., 81 F.3d 541, 548 (5th Cir. 1996)
(admitting lay opinion testimony from a employee that the employer was “phasing out” older
employees, where testimony was based upon various experiences throughout the employee’s
time at the company). Under this interpretation of 701(a), a court may allow homeowners
and owners or officers of businesses to provide opinion testimony “about the value of the
home or business.” 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[1], at 701-9; see also,
e.g., Versai Mgmt. Corp. v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 597 F.3d 729, 737 (5th Cir. 2010)
(concluding that a company president was permitted to provide “a broader range of
testimony than a traditional lay witness” because of the knowledge obtained from her
position); Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 477 F.3d 128, 137–38 (4th Cir.
2007) (finding that a homeowner could opine as to the value of his property). Rule 701’s
Advisory Committee note made clear that the 2000 amendment was not intended to affect
this type of testimony. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (2000 amendment).
The Advisory Committee rationalized that such statements are not based on “experience,
training or specialized knowledge,” but rather on the individual’s “particularized
knowledge” that comes from her position. Id.
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opinions based on “specialized knowledge obtained in his or her vocation or
avocation.”78 However, at least one scholar, Anne Poulin, argues that this
form of opinion testimony is wrongly admitted under Rule 701.79 She
contends that courts that admit “experience-based” testimony without
sufficient scrutiny permit the jury to hear “unreliable and unwarranted
opinion testimony.”80
Moving beyond the personal perception requirement, Rule 701(a) also
requires that a lay witness’s testimony be “rationally based” on this firsthand knowledge.81 The standard for a rational basis is not a high one.82
Under this requirement a lay witness’s opinion must be reasonably based on
the situation in question83 and be free from “irrational leaps of logic.”84 In
other words, the witness must use “everyday” logic to reach her opinion.85
Moreover, where lay opinion is based on the witness’s first-hand
observation in conjunction with her personal knowledge, the witness may
need to show that she indeed possesses the requisite knowledge to provide
the stated opinion.86 Importantly, a lay witness is generally not permitted to
use personal knowledge as the rational basis for the answer to a
hypothetical question.87
78. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[1], at 701-10; see, e.g., United
States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 23–24 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that a police officer’s opinion
testimony, which was “[b]ased on [his] participation in numerous narcotics cases,” was
admissible as lay testimony). Questions remain regarding the extent to which the 2000
amendments to Rules 701 and 702 prevent the admission of this kind of testimony. See 4
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[1], at 701-13.
79. See Poulin, supra note 9, at 554.
80. Id.
81. FED. R. EVID. 701.
82. 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, § 7:3, at 754.
83. See 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 24, § 701.02[4], at 701-9.
84. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[2], at 701-17 to -18.
85. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (2000 amendment) (distinguishing lay
opinion from expert opinion by characterizing lay testimony as “result[ing] from a process of
reasoning familiar in everyday life” (quoting State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 549 (Tenn.
1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d
201, 215 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] lay opinion must be the product of reasoning processes
familiar to the average person in everyday life.”); Alexis v. McDonald’s Rests. of Mass.,
Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 347 (1st Cir. 1995) (excluding lay opinion testimony, where no basis was
provided for the opinion that the employee in question acted with “race-based animus”);
United States v. Cox, 633 F.2d 871, 875–76 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding inadmissible impression
testimony that did not rationally flow from the facts provided); 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 59, § 701.03[2], at 701-17 n.16 (“Rational connection means [that a] normal
person would form [the same] opinion from those perceptions.”).
86. For example, to testify that something smelled like dynamite, the witness must first
establish that, based on prior experiences, she knows the smell of dynamite. 1 BROUN, supra
note 3, § 11, at 57 n.30; see also, e.g., Eason v. Barber, 365 S.E.2d 672, 674–75 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1988) (allowing a seventeen year old with nine months of driving experience and a
eighteen year old with fifteen months of driving experience to testify to the speed of a
vehicle).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding
that lay witnesses are not permitted to answer hypothetical questions and noting that the
distinguishing quality of an expert witness is the entitlement to answer hypothetical
questions); Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 404 (3d Cir. 1980)
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2. Rule 701(b) and the Requirement That Testimony
Be Helpful to the Fact-Finder
The second prong of Rule 701, 701(b), requires that lay opinion
testimony be “helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to
determining a fact in issue.”88 This limitation has been liberally interpreted
in accordance with the modern trend of permitting the fact-finder to hear
opinion testimony.89 The most common situations when lay opinion
testimony is considered helpful include when “[t]he lay witness is in a
better position than the trier of fact to form the opinion,”90 when stating the
facts alone would be inadequate to provide the jury with a “complete
understanding” of the situation,91 or when “[t]he witness has specialized
information” unavailable to the fact-finder.92
However, not all lay opinions fall within the definition of helpfulness.
There are several categories of lay opinion testimony that are commonly not
(characterizing the “essential difference” between an expert witness and a lay witness as the
ability to answer hypothetical questions); see also infra note 102 and accompanying text. But
see Poulin, supra note 9, at 575 (arguing that it would be inaccurate to assert that lay
witnesses can never answer hypothetical questions and offering an example of a hypothetical
that a lay witness could conceivably answer).
88. FED. R. EVID. 701.
89. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[3], at 701-21 (“[Rule 701]
reflects the modern trend to allow the admission of opinion testimony, provided that it is
well founded on personal knowledge and susceptible to specific cross-examination.”
(quoting Joy Mfg. Co. v. Sola Basic Indus. Inc., 697 F.2d 104, 111 (3d Cir. 1982))).
90. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[3], at 701-21; see also, e.g., United
States v. Shabazz, 564 F.3d 280, 286–87 (3d Cir. 2009) (admitting testimony of the
defendant’s accomplice that the defendant was the individual in surveillance video, where
the witness participated in the events the video depicted); United States v. Kornegay, 410
F.3d 89, 95 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that a detective’s identification of the defendant met the
helpfulness prong of Rule 701, where the detective observed the defendant six times “for the
sole purpose of distinguishing him from his twin brother”).
91. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[3], at 701-23; see, e.g., United
States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1430 (9th Cir. 1994) (allowing statements of opinion that the
defendant was “out of control” at the time of the incident because it would be difficult to
convey through facts alone), rev’d in part on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996); Virgin
Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 629–30 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that eyewitness testimony
that the shooting was accidental was admissible as lay opinion because it would be difficult
to accurately articulate why the gun did not seem to be fired on purpose); United States v.
McCullah, 745 F.2d 350, 352 (6th Cir. 1984) (admitting testimony that described the
location in question as “hidden”); see also Poulin, supra note 9, at 564 (explaining that a lay
witness may use opinion both “to express information that cannot be conveyed through a
bare factual account” and to “enrich understanding by adding depth and clarity to [her]
account”).
92. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[3], at 701-24; see also, e.g., United
States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2005) (permitting testimony from the
arresting officer regarding drug points of distribution and heroin packaging because of the
nature of his position in a neighborhood with drug points). Precedent in this area is of
questionable value in light of the 2000 amendments to Rule 701. See 4 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[1], at 701-13. For a more complete discussion of the 2000
amendments to Rule 701, see supra notes 45–60 and accompanying text. Also, for
additional supporting cases, see 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03, at 701-21
to -24 nn.26–28.
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considered to satisfy the helpfulness prong of Rule 701. These include
instances when “[t]he evidence is clear and the trier of fact is perfectly
capable of perceiving, understanding, and interpreting it”;93 the witness
testifies about an issue that generally the fact-finder alone should
determine;94 or the witness offers an opinion about the law.95
While courts generally find that lay opinion testimony is admissible
under Rule 701 even when the opinion is not necessary for the jury’s
decision-making process,96 judges still maintain significant discretion in
determining when to admit lay opinion testimony.97 Accordingly, the
helpfulness requirement acts as a tool for judges to control which lay
opinion testimony to admit or exclude.98
3. Rule 701(c) and the Bar on Scientific, Technical,
or Specialized Knowledge
Finally, 701(c), as explained above,99 was implemented in 2000 to better
draw the line between lay testimony and expert testimony,100 limiting lay
testimony to opinions “not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”101 Further, under
701(c) lay witnesses generally cannot provide opinions in response to a
hypothetical question,102 as their opinions can be based only on the actual
situation of which they possess first-hand knowledge.
93. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03, at 701-26; see also, e.g., United
States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 515–16 (1st Cir. 2011) (excluding a lay witness’s
testimony that she did not believe the defendant’s story because the jury was in “a far
superior position” to make that determination based on the evidence before it); Hester v. BIC
Corp., 225 F.3d 178, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding testimony that the supervisor’s actions
were racially motivated to be inadmissible because the witness was in no better position to
make this determination than the jury).
94. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[3], at 701-27; see also, e.g., United
States v. Gaines, 170 F.3d 72, 81 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that questions of credibility are for
the jury alone); United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1995) (asserting that the
jury determines credibility).
95. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[3], at 701-28. For additional
supporting cases see id. at § 701.03[3], at 701-26 to -27 nn.30–33.
96. Poulin, supra note 9, at 557–58; see also FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s
note (“[N]ecessity as a standard for permitting opinions and conclusions has proved too
elusive and too unadaptable to particular situations for purposes of satisfactory judicial
administration.”); 1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 11, at 55 (explaining that “Federal Rule of
Evidence 701 codifies ‘convenience’ as the standard” rather than necessity).
97. See 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 24, § 701.02, at 701-4 to -5; Garner, supra note
19, at 127.
98. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 59, § 701.03[3], at 701-21.
99. See supra notes 45–60 and accompanying text.
100. See Poulin, supra note 9, at 559.
101. FED. R. EVID. 701; see also id. advisory committee’s note (2000 amendment).
102. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Sinkovich, 232 F.3d 200, 203–04 (4th
Cir. 2000) (finding error where the lower court allowed the lay witness to answer
hypothetical questions); Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 404 (3d Cir.
1980) (describing the fundamental difference between testimony under Rule 701 and Rule
702 as the ability to answer hypothetical questions); see also 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 59, § 701.03[4][a], at 701-31; supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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D. Responses to Rule 701’s Potential Problems
While the same concerns that existed at common law remain regarding
the appropriate role of opinions in lay testimony, Rule 701’s Advisory
Committee note assures that mechanisms exist to prevent the liberalization
of the opinion testimony rule from having detrimental effects on fact-finder
determinations.103 First, the general nature of the adversary system will
continue to encourage lawyers to present the most factually detailed cases
possible in an effort to convince the jury of their arguments.104 Despite the
inclusion of lay opinion testimony, the jury remains the ultimate decider of
what testimony amounts to compelling evidence. Commentators and courts
maintain that juries are fully capable of giving broad opinions not based in
fact the proper weight and consideration.105 This opinion, however, is not
held universally, as some argue that juries are not impervious to influential
opinion testimony.106 At least one commentator has pointed to opinion
testimony from law enforcement officers as particularly problematic in
terms of invading the jury’s independent review of the evidence.107
Second, the Advisory Committee note defends the liberalization of the
opinion rule by arguing that cross-examination and closing statements
inherently function to highlight any unreliable or illogical assertions a
witness may make.108 Such mechanisms thereby decrease the influence of
lay opinion testimony.109 Finally, the Advisory Committee note asserts that
when the mechanisms of the adversary system prove insufficient to exclude

103. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note.
104. See id. (“[T]he detailed account carries more conviction than the broad assertion
. . . .”); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 1929, at 124 (“[I]nference amounts in force usually to
nothing unless it appears to be solidly based on satisfactory data.”).
105. See Grismore v. Consol. Prods. Co., 5 N.W.2d 646, 656 (Iowa 1942) (finding that,
whether fact or opinion, the jury has full rein to accept or reject a witness’s testimony);
1 BROUN, supra note 3, § 12, at 62 (describing the notion that opinion testimony will usurp
the role of the jury as “illogic”); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 1920, at 115–16 (arguing that
opinion testimony does not invade the province of the jury because the jury has the power to
reject the opinion and embrace its own view of the evidence); see also Garner, supra note
19, at 126.
106. See 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6252, at 109–10. Wright and Gold noted:
Nineteenth Century evidence law often assumed that juries lack ability to detect
unreliable evidence. If that assumption is correct, then a jury would be unable to
reject unreliable lay opinion. In this sense . . . the jury might be unable to prevent
usurpation of its power to draw inferences from the evidence. However, Rule 701
simply rejects this pessimistic view of jury ability.
Id.
107. Deon J. Nossel, The Admissibility of Ultimate Issue Expert Testimony by Law
Enforcement Officers in Criminal Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 249 (1993) (arguing that
expert testimony from law enforcement officers may unconsciously influence jurors’
perceptions of the defendant and lead jurors to accept the officer’s conclusions based entirely
upon the officer’s qualification as a expert). While Nossel’s article specifically analyzes
expert law enforcement testimony, the same arguments apply to officers in the cases studied
in this Note. See infra Part III.A.
108. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note.
109. See id.; Hand, supra note 24, at 98 (suggesting that the “analysis of the basis for the
witness’s conclusions” should be done during cross-examination).
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baseless opinion testimony that “amount[s] to little more than choosing up
sides,” the testimony will likely fail the helpfulness prong of the Rule and
be ruled inadmissible.110
E. Practical Application of Rule 701
One of the most valuable cases for understanding the common uses of
Rule 701 is United States v. Yazzie.111 The defendant, Johnny Yazzie, Jr.,
was charged with statutory rape.112 Under the federal statutory rape statute,
Yazzie was permitted to present the defense that he reasonably believed the
minor was at least sixteen years old at the time of the incident.113 To
support his belief, Yazzie presented several witnesses who agreed that the
victim seemed to be at least sixteen years old.114 The trial court ruled that
these witnesses could not testify as to their opinion that the victim seemed
to be of a certain age and required the lay witnesses to provide only factual
observations, such as the fact that she smoked cigarettes or wore make-up
on the night of the incident.115
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that testimony regarding the victim’s
apparent age was admissible under Rule 701.116 The court concluded that
the perception of someone else’s age is exactly the kind of testimony that
may be valuable to a jury but is “difficult to put into words” without
expressing a certain level of opinion.117 The court further emphasized that
“age is a matter on which everyone has an opinion” and, accordingly, is the
type of testimony that is well suited for admissibility under Rule 701.118
As Yazzie demonstrates, in certain circumstances the most valuable lay
testimony will be testimony in the form of an opinion. Additional examples
of typical Rule 701 opinion testimony include the identification of a

110. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note.
111. 976 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor
Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1196 (3d Cir. 1995) (calling Yazzie “[p]erhaps the best judicial
description of” Rule 701 testimony); 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 24, § 701.02, at 701-6
(finding Yazzie to contain a “valuable application of Rule 701”).
112. Yazzie, 976 F.2d at 1253. See generally 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 24,
§ 701.02, at 701-6 to -8 (summarizing Yazzie).
113. Yazzie, 976 F.2d at 1253.
114. Id. at 1254.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1255.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1256.
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person,119 a vehicle’s speed,120 an individual’s emotional121 or mental
state,122 and the status of someone’s health.123
II. APPLYING RULE 701 TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’
LAY OPINION TESTIMONY
In criminal prosecutions, it is common for law enforcement officers to
testify as to the specifics of the criminal investigations in question, as well
as to law enforcement related issues more generally.124 As with all
testimony, for a law enforcement officer to provide general opinion
testimony that does not derive from personal knowledge, but rather from
scientific or specialized knowledge, he must be certified as an expert.125
Whether a law enforcement officer is certified as an expert witness depends
largely on the officer’s ability to satisfy the requirements of Rule 702.126
This Note examines the instances when a law enforcement officer is not
certified as an expert and, accordingly, is limited to providing layperson
testimony.
As explained in Part I.C, witnesses are only permitted to offer lay
opinion testimony when they meet Rule 701’s requirements of personal
perception and helpfulness.127 All the circuit courts agree that some lay
opinion testimony from law enforcement officers is admissible under Rule
701.128 For example, in many of the cases that this Note analyzes, the law
enforcement officer is interpreting recorded conversations.129 Courts agree
that an individual who took part in the conversation should be permitted
under Rule 701 to testify as to the conversation’s meaning.130 Such
witnesses were able to “see and judge facial expressions and body language
of the other participants” and, therefore, possess a unique perspective on the
situation, which a jury simply listening to the recorded conversation would
119. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 809 A.2d 584, 596 (D.C. 2002) (admitting lay
opinion testimony identifying the individual in a surveillance video).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 535, 552 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing the
speed of a car as a “common illustration[]” of lay opinion testimony).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1556–57 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding
that no error existed where lay witnesses were permitted to testify as to the defendant’s
emotional state at the time of the incident in question).
122. See, e.g., Diestel v. Hines, 506 F.3d 1249, 1271 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that lay
testimony can be sufficient evidence to establish an individual’s sanity).
123. See, e.g., Singletary v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 623 F.2d 217, 219 (2d Cir.
1980) (permitting a lay witness to testify about the state of his father’s alcoholism).
124. See Nossel, supra note 107, at 231.
125. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
126. Id.
127. See supra Parts I.C.1–2; see also FED. R. EVID. 701.
128. See 4 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING:
SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE § 41.24 (2012).
129. See United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1101–02 (11th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 293 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630,
640 (8th Cir. 2001).
130. See 4 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 128, § 41.24, at 41-38 to -39 & n.3 (quoting
Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641).
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not have.131 Thus, such testimony satisfies both the personal perception
and helpfulness prongs of Rule 701.
This Note explores the less clear-cut scenario where a law enforcement
officer who possesses general knowledge of the case’s investigation, gained
largely or entirely from an after-the-fact review of investigation materials,
is asked to testify as a lay witness about specifics of the investigation.
Three approaches to this type of situation have emerged within the federal
circuit courts.
Part II.A explores the approaches of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits,132
which have embraced the broadest reading of Rule 701. These circuits
allow a law enforcement officer to testify about the specifics of an
investigation based solely on an after-the-fact review of the investigation
materials.133 Part II.B outlines the pertinent lay opinion decisions in the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits.134 Both circuits have allowed law enforcement
officers to testify about specific aspects of an investigation where the
officer’s after-the-fact knowledge of the event in question was combined
with first-hand knowledge of related information.135 Finally, Part II.C
focuses on the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits’ narrow interpretations
of Rule 701.136 These circuits have refused to admit law enforcement
officers’ lay opinion testimony where the testimony was not based on
personal, first-hand knowledge of the specific event in question that
extended beyond simply reviewing the investigation record.137
A. Tenth and Eleventh Circuits: The Broadest Readings of Rule 701
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ interpretations of Rule 701 allow lay
opinion testimony from law enforcement officers who have general
knowledge of the investigation in question, without requiring personal
perception of the actual events about which the witness is testifying.138 The
controlling cases in these circuits are United States v. Zepeda-Lopez139 and
United States v. Jayyousi.140

131. Id.; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
132. See Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085; United States v. Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 1213 (10th
Cir. 2007).
133. See Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1101–04; Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d at 1221–23.
134. United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Freeman,
498 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2007).
135. See Rollins, 544 F.3d at 830–33; Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904–05.
136. United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 413
F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2001).
137. See Johnson, 617 F.3d at 292–93; Garcia, 413 F.3d at 211–15; Peoples, 250 F.3d at
639–43.
138. See Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102; Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d at 1215.
139. 478 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2007).
140. 657 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011).
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1. United States v. Jayyousi
In Jayyousi, the Eleventh Circuit allowed FBI Agent John Kavanaugh to
testify as a lay witness to the meaning of supposed coded words used in
calls between the defendants.141 During his testimony, Agent Kavanaugh
made many observations, providing testimony such as that the words
“football” and “soccer” actually meant “jihad” and the word “sneakers”
actually meant “support.”142 The agent based his testimony entirely on his
after-the-fact review of the investigation materials.143 This included
“read[ing] thousands of wiretap summaries plus hundreds of verbatim
transcripts, as well as faxes, publications, and speeches” over a five-year
period.144 Although the intercepted calls were mostly in Arabic, Agent
Kavanaugh did not speak that language,145 and someone else provided the
translations into English.146 His testimony was based largely on documents
that were already admitted into evidence.147
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the appellants’ argument regarding
Rule 701(a).148 Appellants asserted that the agent’s opinion testimony
should be deemed inadmissible “because he was not present during all of
the intercepted calls and he did not have a rationally based perception of
what the individuals meant when they used the code words.”149
In response, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that it had never found that
a lay witness must “particip[ate in] or observ[e] . . . a conversation to
provide testimony about the meaning of coded language” within the
conversation.150 The court further asserted that lay witness testimony was
admissible even where “the witness was not involved in the activity about
which he testified.”151
The court cited two other Eleventh Circuit cases to support this
proposition,152 characterizing both cases in an entirely different manner
than the dissent.153 According to the Jayyousi court, the Eleventh Circuit
had held in United States v. Hamaker154 that a FBI financial analyst
possessed sufficient first-hand perception to provide lay opinion testimony,
141. Id. at 1104. It is important to note that in Jayyousi the Eleventh Circuit quotes Rule
701’s Advisory Committee note, id. at 1120–21, which states that 701(a)’s limitation that lay
witness testimony be “rationally based on the witness’s perception.” FED. R. EVID. 701(a)
advisory committee’s note. This speaks to the “familiar requirement of first-hand
knowledge or observation.” Id.
142. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1095.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 1102.
145. Id. at 1122 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1102 (majority opinion).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1102–03.
153. Id. at 1124 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154. 455 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006).
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where the analyst “simply reviewed and summarized over seven thousand
financial documents.”155 Further, the Jayyousi court explained that in
United States v. Gold,156 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a lay witness
possessed first-hand knowledge when the witness’s knowledge was based
on his “own examination of . . . store[] records.”157
The court argued that the testimony in both cases satisfied the
requirements of Rule 701(a) because the testimony was “‘rationally based’
on [the witnesses’] perception of business records.”158 Analogizing Agent
Kavanaugh’s knowledge of the investigation to the facts in Hamaker and
Gold, the Eleventh Circuit found that the agent’s “testimony was also based
on a review of documents and ‘rationally based on [his] perception.’”159
The court distinguished the agent’s testimony from testimony that simply
summarizes admitted evidence by highlighting that the agent reviewed
“thousands of documents, many of which were not admitted into
evidence.”160 Moreover, the majority found that the agent’s extensive
knowledge of the investigation enabled him to understand the supposed
coded language in a way that the less knowledgeable jury would be
incapable of doing.161
Emphasizing further the agent’s cumulative knowledge of the
investigation, the majority also addressed Rule 701(b)’s requirement of
helpfulness.162 According to the majority, Agent Kavanaugh’s opinion
testimony satisfied this requirement because his inferences about the
meaning of the alleged coded language would “help[] the jury understand
better the defendants’ conversation that related to their support of
international terrorism because [the jury] ‘would likely be unfamiliar with
the complexities’ of terrorist activities.”163
The Jayyousi decision also contained an opinion from Judge Rosemary
Barkett concurring in part and dissenting in part.164 Judge Barkett strongly
disagreed with the majority’s lay-opinion-testimony analysis,165 concluding
that Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony was not rationally based on any “firsthand knowledge or observation,” but instead was based entirely on his
general involvement in the case.166 In the course of this argument, the
155. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102 (majority opinion) (quoting Hamaker, 455 F.3d at 1331–
32) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. 743 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1984).
157. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102–03 (quoting Gold, 743 F.2d at 817) (internal quotation
marks omitted). For the dissent’s conflicting analysis of Hamaker and Gold, see infra notes
167–69 and accompanying text.
158. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701(a)) (citation omitted).
159. Id. at 1103 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701(a)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701(b)).
163. Id. (quoting United States v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415, 1430–31 (11th Cir. 1992)).
164. Id. at 1119 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1121–22 (emphasis omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s
note).
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dissent asserted that the court’s reliance on Gold and Hamaker was
erroneous.167 First, the dissent found Gold to be inapplicable because the
case involved the “long-standing practice” of allowing business owners “to
testify to the value or projected profits of the business.”168 Second,
Hamaker did not provide precedent because the court was only answering
whether the witness in question was an expert and never discussed whether
reviewing business records satisfies the first-hand knowledge requirement
of Rule 701.169
The dissent found it particularly problematic that Agent Kavanaugh’s
general involvement in the case was his only basis for providing testimony
regarding the “‘true meaning’ of the defendants’ words.”170 The agent
described no specific knowledge or perception that he possessed to make
him more capable than the jury of interpreting the phone calls.171
Moreover, the dissent argued that opinion testimony should be
admissible under Rule 701(a) only when the witness has “personally
experienced an event and therefore ha[s] the ability to describe [his]
layperson’s perception of the event that the jury cannot otherwise
experience for itself.”172 Indeed, the unique characteristic of this type of
knowledge, according to the dissenting opinion, is that the witness uses his
“sensory and experiential observations that were made as a first-hand
witness to a particular event.”173
Turning to the specific instance of a law enforcement officer testifying
about the meaning of a conversation, the dissent gave the following
definition for first-hand knowledge:
A law enforcement officer’s lay opinion about the meaning of a
conversation is based on his or her first-hand knowledge when he or she
is either (1) a personal participant in a conversation as an undercover
agent, or (2) a listener to a conversation while observing a defendants’
behavior in real time to coordinate the conversation with the conduct.174

The dissent further stated that the facts of Jayyousi were “materially
indistinguishable” from the facts of United States v. Peoples,175 in which
the Eighth Circuit found that such law enforcement testimony was

167. Id. at 1124.
168. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (2000 amendment)); see
supra note 77 and accompanying text.
169. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1125.
170. Id. at 1122.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1120.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1123.
175. 250 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2001).
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inadmissible.176 The dissent also cited United States v. Garcia,177 a Second
Circuit case that stands for the same general proposition.178
On the issue of the helpfulness requirement of 701(b), the dissent further
disagreed with the majority’s characterization of Agent Kavanaugh’s
opinion testimony as “‘helpful’” within the meaning of Rule 701.179 As the
dissent explained, while “a witness simply agree[ing] with the contentions
of one side” may be helpful in some sense of the word, Rule 701 is not
intended to allow lay witnesses to give testimony that does nothing more
than “give one side’s understanding of the evidence.”180
2. United States v. Zepeda-Lopez
In Zepeda-Lopez the Tenth Circuit came to the same conclusion as the
Eleventh Circuit regarding Rule 701, allowing FBI Special Agent John
Barrett to testify that it was the defendant’s voice on audiotapes and image
in a videotape.181 While the parties had already stipulated to the existence
of a drug conspiracy, the question remained whether defendant Jesus
Salvador Zepeda-Lopez was a member of the conspiracy.182 Of the six
telephone calls admitted into evidence, Zepeda-Lopez admitted that his
voice was on three of them but denied that his voice was on another call.183
Agent Barrett, the prosecution’s only witness, testified as to which voices
on the tapes belonged to Zepeda-Lopez.184 The agent provided similar
testimony regarding Zepeda-Lopez’s alleged image in a video.185 Agent
Barrett’s testimony was based solely on his review of the same tapes that
were offered into evidence.186
The defendant argued for the exclusion of the agent’s testimony because
Agent Barrett “lacked personal knowledge of Mr. Zepeda-Lopez’s voice
and appearance”187 and “had an inadequate basis” for the identifications.188
Further, the defendant asserted that the jury was just as capable as the agent
to determine whether it was the defendant’s voice in the recorded calls and

176. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1124 (citing Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641). For a complete
discussion of the opinion in Peoples, see infra Part II.C.1.
177. 413 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2005).
178. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1124 (citing Garcia, 413 F.3d at 212). For a complete
discussion of the opinion in Garcia, see infra Part II.C.2.
179. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1125.
180. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (“If . . . attempts are made
to introduce meaningless assertions which amount to little more than choosing up sides,
exclusion for lack of helpfulness is called for by the rule.”).
181. United States v. Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1215–16.
184. Id. at 1215.
185. Id. at 1217.
186. Id. at 1215–17.
187. Id. at 1219.
188. Id. at 1220 (quoting Brief of Defendant Appellant at 13, Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d
1213 (No. 05-4246)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the defendant’s image in the video and, therefore, the testimony was not
helpful.189
The court addressed the appeal by analyzing Agent Barrett’s testimony
under Rule 701(b), making no mention of the defendant’s Rule 701(a)
argument.190 The court relied in part on the Tenth Circuit’s holding in
United States v. Bush.191 In Bush, a law enforcement officer identified the
defendant in recorded calls after having conducted at least three face-to-face
interviews with the defendant in question.192 Finding that the trial court
had not abused its discretion, the court in Zepeda-Lopez held that, like in
Bush, Agent Barrett’s testimony satisfied the helpfulness prong of Rule 701
because the agent had an opportunity to review the videotapes “many
times.”193
The Tenth Circuit concluded its discussion of Rule 701 by restating the
district court’s instruction to the jury that it should consider the truth value
of all admitted evidence, including testimony.194 In particular, the district
court asserted that the jury should consider witnesses’ “relationship to the
government or the defendant” and “their opportunity to observe or acquire
knowledge concerning the facts about which they testified.”195
B. Seventh and Ninth Circuits: The Moderate Readings of Rule 701
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have taken a somewhat different
approach than the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits to lay opinion testimony
based on after-the-fact reviews. Where a law enforcement officer’s afterthe-fact knowledge of the event in question is combined with related firsthand knowledge, these circuits have allowed the officer to offer lay opinion
testimony.196 The controlling cases in these circuits are United States v.
Freeman197 and United States v. Rollins.198
1. United States v. Freeman
In Freeman, the Ninth Circuit found no error where the district court
admitted a detective’s lay interpretations of recorded phone calls.199
Detective Bob Shin, the prosecution’s lead witness,200 opined on the
meaning of the supposed drug jargon used between defendant Kevin
Freeman and two of his alleged co-conspirators.201 The detective explained
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 1222.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Bush, 405 F.3d 909, 918 (10th Cir. 2005)).
Id.
Id. at 1222–23.
Id.
See infra notes 204–06, 212–13 and accompanying text.
498 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2007).
544 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2008).
Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904–05.
Id. at 898.
Id.
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that while there was no explicit reference to cocaine, the calls indeed
referenced cocaine-related drug transactions.202 Though not a party to the
conversations, Detective Shin based his testimony on his “direct perception
of several hours of intercepted conversations—in some instances coupled
with direct observation of [the suspects]—and other facts he learned during
the investigation.”203
Finding that Detective Shin satisfied the requirements of Rule 701, the
Ninth Circuit stated that the detective’s perception of the conversations
Further, the court noted that
amounted to “direct knowledge.”204
throughout his testimony, the detective attempted to “explain his reasoning
and the basis for his opinion.”205 This basis included “context and his
knowledge of the investigation as it was unfolding.”206
2. United States v. Rollins
Following the approach of the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit in
Rollins admitted lay opinion testimony from DEA Agent John McGarry
regarding the general meaning of recorded telephone conversations.207 The
agent testified that based on the recorded calls, he believed that defendant
James E. Rollins, Sr. was supplying Richard Pittman with cocaine obtained
from James Rollins, Jr.208 Agent McGarry’s testimony was based both on
his review of the recorded calls and his subsequent surveillance of the
conspirators and interviews with witnesses familiar with both the
conspiracy and the defendants.209 Agent McGarry testified that through
surveillance the case agents often were able to confirm their suspicions
about the meaning of the recorded calls.210 The witness interviews further
provided Agent McGarry with information to enlighten his understanding
of the recorded calls.211
Upon outlining the several bases for Agent McGarry’s testimony, the
Seventh Circuit determined that the agent possessed a sufficient foundation
for providing lay opinion testimony about the recorded calls.212 The court
characterized his knowledge as both “first-hand perception of the
intercepted phone calls” and “personal, extensive experience with this
particular drug investigation.”213 In the course of its analysis, the Seventh
Circuit explicitly disagreed with the Second Circuit’s conception of

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id. at 904–05.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 900.
Id.
United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 831 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 828.
Id. at 831–32.
Id. at 832.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 831–32.
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permissible lay opinion testimony as explained in United States v.
Grinage.214
The Seventh Circuit also distinguished Rollins from its decision in
United States v. Oriedo215 by explaining that the agent’s testimony in
Oriedo was impermissible because it was not based solely on knowledge
gained from his investigation of that case.216 Regardless of this distinction,
however, the Ninth Circuit conceded that Agent McGarry’s “testimony
approache[d] the line dividing lay opinion testimony from expert opinion
testimony.”217
C. Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits:
The Narrowest Readings of Rule 701
The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have limited admissible lay
opinion by more narrowly interpreting the definitions of first-hand
knowledge and helpfulness.218 First-hand knowledge in these circuits
requires a substantial personal relationship to the event in question, such as
through observation or participation.219 The controlling cases in these
circuits are United States v. People,220 United States v. Garcia,221 and
United States v. Johnson.222
1. United States v. Peoples
In Peoples, the Eighth Circuit held that FBI Special Agent Joan Neal’s
testimony about recorded telephone conversations and prison visitations
was inadmissible because she lacked first-hand knowledge of the
conversations at issue.223 Xavier Lightfoot was arrested and charged with
robbery.224 During his pretrial incarceration Lightfoot learned that his
former roommate, Jovan Ross, was cooperating with law enforcement.225
According to the government, Cornelius Peoples feared that if Ross
continued to cooperate with law enforcement, Peoples’ role in the robbery
would be revealed.226 The government theorized that, in response Ross’s

214. Id. at 832; see infra note 253 and accompanying text (explaining that Garcia
affirmed the holding in Grinage).
215. 498 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding testimony impermissible where a lay law
enforcement officer was asked about the general use of a certain type of baggie).
216. Rollins, 544 F.3d at 832–33.
217. Id. at 833.
218. See United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 293 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 641 (8th
Cir. 2001).
219. See Johnson, 617 F.3d at 293; Garcia, 413 F.3d at 213; Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641.
220. 250 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2001).
221. 413 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2005).
222. 617 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2010).
223. Peoples, 250 F.3d at 639–42.
224. Id. at 634.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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cooperation, Peoples and Lightfoot entered into an agreement to pay
someone to kill Ross.227
During the trial, the government played conversations between Lightfoot
and Peoples that were recorded when Peoples visited Lightfoot in jail.228
While the recordings played to the jury, Agent Neal was allowed to opine
as to the meaning of the speakers’ words.229 She interpreted both allegedly
coded language and statements made in plain English.230 For example,
when a recording of Lightfoot asking for a loan was played, Agent Neal
testified that Lightfoot had “need[ed] a loan to pay the hit man to actually
murder Ross.”231
The court found that Agent Neal’s testimony was improperly admitted as
Rule 701 lay opinion testimony,232 because Agent Neal neither personally
observed the activities that the conversations concerned nor heard or
observed the conversation itself.233 Instead, the court described Agent
Neal’s knowledge of the matter as based only on an after-the-fact
investigation and “not on her perception of the facts.”234 The Eighth
Circuit characterized this type of testimony as “a narrative gloss” on the
facts of the case, comprised entirely of her opinion about the conversations’
meanings.235
Indeed, despite admitting the lay opinion testimony of Agent Neal, the
lower court recognized that the testimony should be viewed differently than
normal witness testimony.236 Acknowledging that it was possible that
Agent Neal’s testimony was inadmissible under Rule 701, the lower court
instructed jurors to consider the testimony not as evidence but as “snippets
of early argument from the witness stand.”237 The Eighth Circuit found that
this instruction had no basis in the Federal Rules of Evidence and served the
practical function of making inadmissible testimony admissible.238
The court pointed to Rule 602 in order to emphasize that a lay witness
must possess “personal knowledge of the matters about which she
testifies.”239 Accordingly, the court offered only three circumstances when
law enforcement officers can provide lay opinion testimony regarding
recorded conversations.240 These included “when the law enforcement
227. Id.
228. Id. at 634–35.
229. Id. at 640.
230. Id.
231. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
232. Id. at 641–42.
233. Id. at 640.
234. Id. at 641.
235. Id. at 640 (“[F]or example, she testified that when one of the defendants referred to
buying a plane ticket for Ross, he in fact meant killing Ross.”).
236. See id. at 641.
237. Id. at 640–41 (quoting United States v. Peoples, No. 98-00149-01/02-CR-W-6, 2000
WL 97180, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 25, 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
238. Id. at 641–42.
239. Id. at 641. For the full text of Rule 602, see supra note 68.
240. Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641.

2013] YOU MUST BE THIS QUALIFIED TO OFFER AN OPINION 3467
officer is a participant in the conversation, has personal knowledge of the
facts being related in the conversation, or observed the conversations as
they occurred.”241 Additionally, the court made a point to distinguish lay
opinion testimony from expert testimony, stating that “[l]ay opinion
testimony is admissible only to help the jury or the court to understand the
facts about which the witness is testifying and not to provide specialized
explanations or interpretations that an untrained layman could not make if
perceiving the same acts or events.”242
2. United States v. Garcia
Similar to the Eighth Circuit in Peoples, the Second Circuit’s Garcia
decision held that DEA Agent Paul Klemick’s opinion testimony was
inadmissible because the agent’s testimony was neither based on his
personal perceptions243 nor helpful to the jury.244 The prosecution admitted
into evidence several recorded phone calls between defendants Yuri Garcia
and Francisco Valentin, as well as conversations between the two
defendants and other members of the alleged drug conspiracy.245
Following the admission of these calls, Agent Klemick was asked to testify
regarding the roles he believed Garcia and Valentin played in the
conspiracy.246 The prosecution asked Agent Klemick to testify based on his
general experience with the investigation.247 Subsequently, the agent
testified that his opinion was grounded on the recorded phone calls, as well
as the law enforcement database and surveillance.248
The Second Circuit found several problems with admitting this testimony
under Rule 701. First, the court found that Agent Klemick’s testimony
failed to meet the requirements of 701(a) because it was not “based on the
Quoting Rule 701’s Advisory
witness’s personal perceptions.”249
Committee note, the court emphasized that the “‘traditional objective’” of
Rule 701 is to provide the fact-finder with “‘an accurate reproduction of the
event’ at issue,” an objective that may sometimes require admitting
inferential or opinion testimony from laypersons.250 However, the court
emphasized the distinction between a law enforcement officer’s lay opinion
testimony that is based on personal perceptions and lay opinion testimony
241. Id. The holding from Peoples was cited approvingly in the Sixth Circuit case United
States v. Ganier, 468 F.3d 920, 927 (6th Cir. 2006). There, the court, relying in part on
Peoples, determined that testimony regarding computer software required specialized
knowledge that only an expert witness could provide. Id. This decision suggests that the
Sixth Circuit is likely to follow the approach of the Eighth Circuit if presented with a similar
case involving law enforcement testimony.
242. Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641.
243. United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 211–12 (2d Cir. 2005).
244. Id. at 215.
245. Id. at 208–09.
246. Id. at 212.
247. Id. at 209.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 211.
250. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note).
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that is based on the entirety of an investigation.251 The Second Circuit
explained that Agent Klemick’s opinion testimony did not meet the
requirements of 701(a) because it “drew on the total information developed
by all the officials who participated in the investigation” and “was not
limited to his personal perceptions.”252 Summarizing and affirming the
holding in Grinage, the Second Circuit explained that this type of opinion
testimony does not fall within Rule 701 because it does “not present[] the
jury with the unique insights of an eyewitness’s personal perceptions.”253
Second, the court found that Agent Klemick’s testimony was not helpful
under Rule 701(b) because it did little more than summarize the admitted
evidence in a way that told the jury how to decide the case.254 The Second
Circuit concluded that procedural limitations are placed on opinion
testimony specifically to ensure that witnesses do not invade the province of
the jury.255 The court further emphasized that if such testimony were
admissible, jurors reviewing evidence would be unnecessary, as witnesses
simply would hand them the proper analysis.256
3. United States v. Johnson
Citing Peoples in its decision, the Fourth Circuit in Johnson found that
DEA Agent Randy Smith’s lay opinion testimony about the meaning of
recorded phone calls was inadmissible based on his lack of personal
perception.257 At trial, Agent Smith testified to the meaning of four phone
calls, which allegedly pointed to defendant Walter Johnson’s involvement
in a drug conspiracy.258 The phone calls were between Johnson and an
individual named Mayo Pickens, who provided cocaine in the area.259
Agent Smith was not a participant in the investigation’s surveillance and
did not “listen[] to all of the relevant calls in question.”260 Instead, the
agent based his testimony regarding the phone calls on “information from
interviews with suspects and charged members of the conspiracy after
listening to the phone calls.”261 The court further noted that the prosecution
had elicited testimony regarding the agent’s “credentials and training,”
despite not attempting to certify him as an expert.262
The court characterized the knowledge obtained from the suspect
interviews as “second-hand information” and the conclusions he formed as

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 210–11.
Id. at 214.
United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 292–93 (4th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 288–89.
Id.
Id. at 293.
Id.
Id.
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a result of this information to be “post-hoc assessments.”263 Further, the
court analogized Johnson to the facts of Peoples, finding that Agent Smith
similarly lacked first-hand knowledge about the investigation in question
and provided no more than “a narrative gloss that consisted almost entirely
of her personal opinions of what the conversations meant.”264
III. REINING IN THE USE OF LAY OPINION TESTIMONY TO ACHIEVE
RULE 701’S OBJECTIVES
Jurors are intended to be fair and impartial triers of fact. Accordingly,
they should never possess first-hand knowledge of the events surrounding
the case they decide. First-hand accounts, however, provide valuable
insight into the facts and circumstances of a disputed situation. Lay
witnesses, therefore, play the vital role of explaining their own first-hand
knowledge,265 in hopes of providing the jury with as realistic a re-creation
of the events as possible.266 Despite the clear value of lay opinion
testimony, however, our legal system, through the adoption of Rule 701,
has demanded limits to such testimony.267
This part discusses the flaws and merits of the circuit courts’ approaches
to limiting law enforcement officers’ lay opinion testimony and analyzes
the extent to which each approach to Rule 701 aligns with the Rule’s
objective as stated in the Advisory Committee note. The Advisory
Committee note explains that the Rule is intended to help “put[] the trier of
fact in possession of an accurate reproduction of the event.”268 This
objective, along with the remainder of the Rule’s Advisory Committee note,
should be closely followed.269
Parts III.A and III.B highlight the errors in the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits’ approaches, arguing that the lay opinion holdings of
these circuits should not be followed. Part III.A explains that, by reading
Rule 701 to include law enforcement officers who complete only after-thefact reviews, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have undermined the
objective of the Rule and opened the door for prejudicial testimony. Part
III.B underscores that the approaches of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
similarly run counter to Rule 701’s Advisory Committee note, despite
appearing to require greater first-hand knowledge. While the law
enforcement officers in these circuits may need to possess related first-hand
263. Id.; see also C. Rauch Wise, It Means What It Needs To Mean: Combating Drug
Jargon Testimony, 35 CHAMPION 28, 29 (2011) (approving of the decision in Johnson and
concluding that, “[i]f the rule were otherwise, a case agent could interview the witnesses,
listen to the tapes, and then testify that based upon the telephone conversation and the facts
of the case, the defendant was involved in a conspiracy”).
264. Johnson, 617 F.3d at 293 (quoting United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 640 (8th
Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
265. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note.
266. See id.; supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
267. See FED. R. EVID. 701; supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
268. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note.
269. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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knowledge, in the end, their knowledge of the event in question is still afterthe-fact and is therefore insufficient to satisfy Rule 701. Finally, Part III.C
emphasizes the merits of the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits’
approaches to Rule 701, explaining why an amended version of these
courts’ analyses should be followed. These circuits limit law enforcement
testimony under Rule 701 in a manner that serves the Rule’s true purpose
and helps prevent the jury from hearing unqualified, unhelpful testimony.
A. The Problem of Overadmitting Lay Opinion Testimony
in the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have permitted law enforcement officers
to provide lay opinion testimony even where the officer possesses only
after-the-fact knowledge of the specific event in question.270 Admittance of
such testimony constitutes a very broad interpretation of Rule 701(a)’s
personal perception requirement271 and Rule 701(b)’s helpfulness
requirement.272 Such a reading of Rule 701 results in an overly inclusive
lay opinion rule. More specifically, the approaches of the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits wrongly ignore the preference for providing the jury with
facts over opinions whenever possible,273 thereby admitting lay opinion that
unreasonably extends the reach of Rule 701, threatens the province of the
jury, and provides an unfair advantage to the prosecution. Accordingly, the
approaches of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits conflict with the purpose of
Rule 701 and should not be followed.
As explained in Part II.A.1, in Jayyousi a law enforcement officer
testified as a lay witness after having preformed only an after-the-fact
review of the investigation materials.274 Addressing Rule 701(a) first, the
court in Jayyousi explained that the Eleventh Circuit had never required a
lay person testifying about allegedly coded language to participate in or
observe the conversation in question.275 The court extended this assertion
further, stating that lay witnesses do not need to be involved in events to
testify about them.276 Meanwhile, the Tenth Circuit in Zepeda-Lopez
wholly ignored the Rule 701(a) issue, despite the appellant’s argument that
the testifying agent did not have the requisite personal knowledge to
support his visual and audio identifications.277 Concluding that the lower
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the agent’s lay opinion
testimony,278 the Tenth Circuit found no error in the agent basing his lay
opinion testimony on nothing more than his after-the-fact review of the
270. See United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1102–04 (11th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 1213, 1220–23 (10th Cir. 2007).
271. FED. R. EVID. 701.
272. Id.
273. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
274. Supra note 143 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 187, 190 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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same videotape and recorded phone calls that were submitted into
evidence.279
The Advisory Committee note for Rule 701 states that a “witness’s
perception” means the witness’s “first-hand knowledge or observation.”280
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits did not suggest in either Jayyousi or
Zepeda-Lopez that the testifying agent actually observed the incident in
question. Accordingly, these circuits must believe that an after-the-fact
review of investigation materials meets the definition of first-hand
knowledge.281
Based on this interpretation, it appears that, in the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits, any investigating officer is qualified to offer lay opinion testimony
if he merely reviews materials that pertain to the investigation. An
interpretation with this result wholly ignores the reason for requiring firsthand knowledge for lay opinion testimony, which is to ensure that only
individuals who actually perceived an incident are permitted to give
opinions about it.282 As the dissent in Jayyousi explained, witnesses should
not provide lay opinion testimony unless they “personally experienced an
event and therefore have the ability to describe their layperson’s perception
of the event that the jury cannot otherwise experience for itself.”283
Individuals who personally perceived an event are uniquely qualified to
offer lay opinion because they possess “sensory and experiential
observations” otherwise unavailable to the jury.284 The dissent’s statement
points to one of the essential elements that sets a lay witness apart from a
jury member: a first-hand knowledge of what occurred, which cannot be
replicated by simply reviewing the documents in evidence.285
More specifically, a law enforcement officer such as Agent Kavanaugh in
Jayyousi or Agent Barrett in Zepeda-Lopez does not possess information
that will increase the accuracy of a jury’s understanding because simply
reviewing documents is essentially the same task that is given to the jury.
That the witness has also reviewed the evidence and can offer his or her
own opinion about its significance does not mean that the witness has firsthand knowledge of the events any more than the jury has first-hand
knowledge.
The court in Jayyousi attempted to counter the argument that the agent’s
testimony simply summarized admitted evidence by explaining that the
agent reviewed thousands of documents, including those that were not
submitted into evidence.286 However, as the dissent in Jayyousi argued,
and as this Note contends, general knowledge of an investigation does not
279. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
280. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note; see supra Part I.C.1.
281. Indeed the court in Jayyousi even quotes the Advisory Committee note when
discussing Rule 701. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
283. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1120 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
284. Id.
285. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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provide a sufficient basis to offer a lay opinion regarding the specific events
of an investigation.287 To hold otherwise undermines Rule 701 testimony.
Indeed, lay testimony based on reviewing documents in evidence does not
fall within any of the commonly accepted forms of a “witness’s perception”
explained in Part I.C.1.
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ approaches to law enforcement lay
opinion testimony also provide an unfair tool for the prosecution. As
contended above, by effectively eliminating the first-hand knowledge
requirement of Rule 701, it appears that a law enforcement officer need
only review an investigation’s case file to then offer opinion testimony
about the case. Providing the prosecution with this type of tool unfairly
advantages the government, as the defendant is unlikely to be able to
produce a similarly situated law enforcement officer to testify to an
alternative interpretation of the investigation.
When examined under Rule 701(b)’s helpfulness requirement, the flaws
of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ analyses are further demonstrated. In
Jayyousi the court argued that Agent Kavanaugh’s testimony was helpful
because the agent was able to interpret the conversation within the wider
context of the investigation as a whole.288 Employing a similar argument in
Zepeda-Lopez, the Tenth Circuit found that Agent Barrett’s opinion
testimony was helpful because he had the opportunity to review the
videotape and audiotapes several times.289
While Rule 701 testimony is not wholly limited to “necessary”
testimony,290 it is limited to testimony that increases the accuracy of the
Both courts, however, improperly defined
jury’s understanding.291
“helpfulness” under Rule 701(b). Neither Agent Kavanaugh in Jayyousi
nor Agent Barrett in Zepeda-Lopez was helpful under Rule 701(b) because
the jury was as capable as the witness to determine the significance of the
evidence in question.292 Accordingly, such witness testimony is in direct
conflict with Rule 701’s Advisory Committee note, which states that
testimony should be deemed inadmissible if it “amount[s] to little more than
choosing up sides.”293 The dissent in Jayyousi supported this assertion,
finding that because the testimony in question was about facts already
before the jury, the witness did nothing more than state the prosecution’s
understanding of the facts.294 Where sufficient facts exist for a jury to

287. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
291. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note; see supra notes 90–92 and
accompanying text.
292. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
293. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note; see also supra note 110 and
accompanying text.
294. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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make its decision, wholly unnecessary lay opinions should not be
admitted.295
Finally, the approaches of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits should not be
followed because they allow lay opinion testimony that threatens to invade
the province of the jury. While some scholars have rejected the argument
that lay opinion testimony will usurp the function of the jury,296 this
concern deserves greater attention,297 particularly where the witness in
question is a law enforcement officer providing opinions based on an afterthe-fact review of the investigation. When a law enforcement officer did
not actually participate in or observe the situation, prosecutors may present
the officer’s general knowledge of the case or professional experience as
the basis for his opinion.298 In many ways, this framing dresses up a lay
witness in an expert witness’s clothes, suggesting that the witness has such
substantial knowledge of the case that he is qualified to testify about an
aspect of which he was not involved.299 This form of testimony threatens to
invade the province of a jury in the same way that some have argued expert
testimony does.300 Analogizing authoritative lay witnesses with expert
witness, jurors may, whether consciously or unconsciously, accept
authoritative lay witnesses’ opinions without performing a proper,
independent assessment of the evidence.301 Accordingly, special care
should be paid to the decision to admit law enforcement officers’ lay
opinion testimony, a care that the approaches of the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits do not demonstrate.
The approaches of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits should be disregarded
in light of their overly broad interpretations of Rule 701(a) and Rule 701(b).
B. Continuing Problems of an Overly Inclusive Lay Opinion Rule Found
Under the Moderate Interpretation of Rule 701
While the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, at first, appear to correct the
problems of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits regarding the personal
perception requirement of Rule 701(a), closer examination reveals that
these circuits continue to embrace interpretations of Rule 701(a) that run
counter to the Rule’s purpose and, thus, should not be followed.
Both Freeman and Rollins involved officers testifying regarding the
meaning of recorded phone calls.302 In both cases, just as in Jayyousi and
Zepeda-Lopez, the testifying officer did not actually observe or participate
295. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 254–55 and accompanying text.
298. See, e.g., United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1103 (11th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 293 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820,
831–32 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 902 (9th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 2005).
299. See supra notes 206, 213 and accompanying text.
300. See Nossel, supra note 107, at 249.
301. See id.
302. See supra notes 199, 207 and accompanying text.

3474

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

in the recorded conversation in question.303 Accordingly, in relation to the
specific events about which the officers testified, the witnesses in Freeman
and Rollins possessed no more first-hand knowledge or experience than the
officers in Jayyousi and Zepeda-Lopez and were therefore no closer to
having personally perceived the event. However, unlike Jayyousi and
Zepeda-Lopez, the officers in Freeman and Rollins did obtain first-hand
knowledge subsequent to hearing the recordings, which helped inform their
understandings of the conversations’ meanings.304 This subsequent
knowledge included conducting surveillance305 and interviewing persons of
interest.306 Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits offered this subsequent
first-hand knowledge as further evidence that the officer was qualified
under Rule 701(a) to provide testimony about the meaning of the recorded
calls.307
Under a proper reading of Rule 701, however, this form of first-hand
knowledge does not enhance an officer’s qualification to testify because it
does not increase the officer’s first-hand perception of the conversation
itself. To provide lay opinion testimony about a specific aspect of an
investigation, courts should require an officer to have personally perceived
the subject of the testimony.308 Merely possessing related information that
influences the officer’s understanding of the event is not sufficient.
Examining an analogous set of facts, the Fourth Circuit in Johnson
explained that interviews with suspects were only second-hand information
in reference to the meaning of the recorded calls in question.309 In other
words, the only possible source of first-hand knowledge regarding an event
is personal perception of the event itself. Lay opinion testimony based on
any other information constitutes nothing more than “post-hoc
assessments.”310
If the Rule was otherwise, as the approaches of the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits encourage, the lay opinion rule would remain overly broad and
result in the same negative consequences outlined in Part III.A. This is
because none of the personal perception problems explained above would
be solved. An individual who did not personally perceive an event would
still be testifying to its significance.
Moreover, the officers in Freeman and Rollins would likely be able to
provide lay opinion testimony about the interviews and surveillance—
independent from interpreting the recorded conversations—because they
personally perceived the interviews and surveillance, as Rule 701 requires.
It would then be for the jury to decide whether the combination of these
pieces of evidence—the recorded calls, the surveillance, and the
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

See supra notes 203, 209 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 203, 209–10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 203, 210 and accompanying text.
See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 205–06, 213 and accompanying text.
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interviews—constituted evidence of criminal activity. Additionally, the
prosecution could use both the opening and closing statements to argue the
connection between these pieces of evidence.311 Moving away from the
approaches of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, therefore, would not deprive
the jury of any necessary information and would prevent a detrimental
reading of Rule 701.
C. Creating Meaningful Limitations for Law Enforcement
Lay Opinion Testimony Under Rule 701
Departing from the overly inclusive approaches of the Seventh, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the approaches of the Second, Fourth, and
Eighth Circuits provide valuable guidance for the proper interpretation of
Rule 701(a) and 701(b), maintaining a focus on the Rule’s objective, as
well as the other principles outlined in the Advisory Committee note.312
First, this Note recommends that courts embrace an augmented version of
the Rule 701(a) test for first-hand knowledge outlined in Peoples,313 which
will align with the dissenting opinion in Jayyousi.314 Second, this Note
supports an approach to Rule 701(b) that follows the Garcia court’s
analysis.
Peoples, Garcia, and Johnson each promote interpretations of Rule
701(a) that help solve the problems associated with an overly inclusive lay
opinion rule as outlined in Part III.A and Part III.B. Most importantly,
these circuits embrace a definition of first-hand knowledge that recognizes
the purpose behind the personal perception requirement of Rule 701(a)315
and ensures that only those who are properly qualified offer lay opinions.
To begin, in Garcia the court emphasized that Agent Klemick did not have
first-hand knowledge of the recorded calls in question because his opinion
was based not on his personal perceptions but on the “total information
developed by all the officials who participated in the investigation.”316 The
court concluded that this did not serve Rule 701’s objective of providing a

311. See 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trials § 444, at 32 (2007) (“[During closing argument c]ounsel
is granted wide latitude to discuss the merits of the case, both as to the law and facts, and is
entitled to argue his or her case vigorously and to argue all reasonable inferences from the
evidence.”).
312. The First Circuit, Keller v. United States, 38 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 1994), and Third
Circuits, Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221 (2008), could be interpreted as falling
within this grouping of circuits. However, as neither circuit has addressed this issue with
specific reference to law enforcement officers, they remain outside the scope of this Note.
See generally Emily Jennings, Comment, Witness History As Juries Become History: How
the Eleventh Circuit Allowed the Opinions of Law Witnesses To Overtake the Duty of the
Jury in United States v. Jayyousi, 54 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 145 (2013), http://bclaw
review.org/files/2013/04/11_Jennings.pdf (discussing the Rule 701 circuit split and reaching
a similar conclusion).
313. See supra notes 240–41 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
316. United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 2005).
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more “‘accurate reproduction of the event’”317 because it offered no
“unique insights of an eyewitness’s personal perceptions.”318 Johnson took
a similar stance, finding testimony based on purely after-the-fact
investigation to be “post-hoc assessments.”319
With the fundamental concepts from Garcia and Johnson in mind, this
Note turns to Peoples to provide a more concrete test for when law
enforcement testimony meets the requirements of Rule 701(a). In Peoples,
a case that had substantially the same facts as Jayyousi,320 the Eighth
Circuit found an officer’s lay opinion testimony to be inadmissible because
she did not personally perceive the recorded conversations in question.321
The court concluded that such testimony amounted to no more than a
“narrative gloss” of the facts of the case.322 The court then outlined the
three specific instances when a law enforcement officer may testify about
the meaning of a recorded conversation.323 The list is as follows: “when
the law enforcement officer is a participant in the conversation, has personal
knowledge of the facts being related in the conversation, or observed the
conversations as they occurred.”324
While the first and third prongs of this test are self-explanatory, the
meaning of the second prong is somewhat less apparent. To clarify, the
second prong is not satisfied when a law enforcement officer obtains
knowledge regarding the conversation subsequent to hearing the
conversation, such as in the Seventh and Ninth Circuit cases.325 Instead this
prong refers to individuals who possess personal knowledge of the
conversation’s content because of past experiences with the subject at
issue.326 In Peoples, the court cited United States v. Saulter,327 a case
where a former drug dealer who had personal knowledge of the drug
conspiracy discussed in the recorded calls was permitted to provide opinion
testimony about the call’s meaning.328 The Fourth Circuit in Johnson
further confirmed this conception of the second prong.329 Analogizing its
facts to the facts in Peoples, Johnson explicitly found that information
gathered subsequent to hearing a recorded call was insufficient to qualify a
law enforcement officer to give lay opinion testimony about the
conversation’s meaning.330
317. Id. at 211 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note).
318. Id. at 212.
319. United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 293 (4th Cir. 2010).
320. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
322. United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 640 (8th Cir. 2001).
323. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
324. Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641.
325. See supra notes 203, 209–10 and accompanying text.
326. See Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641 (citing United States v. Saulter, 60 F.3d 270, 276 (7th
Cir. 1995)); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
327. Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641.
328. Saulter, 60 F.3d at 276.
329. See supra notes 263–64 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
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While the second prong differs somewhat from the test seen in the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits, this Note argues that, realistically, it poses
substantially the same threats to the integrity of the testimony before the
jury. Alternatively, the dissent in Jayyousi contended that the requirement
of first-hand knowledge is only satisfied where the law enforcement officer
was “either (1) a personal participant in a conversation as an undercover
agent, or (2) a listener to a conversation while observing a defendants’
behavior in real time to coordinate the conversation with the conduct.”331
This more limited test accounts for the potential problems that the second
prong would create and, in the end, does not prevent any necessary
testimony from being admitted.332
The two categories outlined in Peoples, and reiterated in the Jayyousi
dissent, should be extended to all law enforcement officer testimony
because they are broad enough to encompass all scenarios when an officer
would properly offer lay opinion testimony, while narrow enough to help
exclude testimony that is not actually based on first-hand knowledge.
Accordingly, confining law enforcement lay opinion testimony will help
solve the various problems associated with lay officer testimony. First, the
two distinct categories help ensure that testimony does not, as the court in
Garcia explained, “dr[a]w on the total information developed by all the
officials who participated in the investigation.”333 Officers will need to
point to a specific experience in which they personally perceived the event
in question. Second, the categories prevent parties from disguising
testimony based on specialized knowledge, which should be certified under
Rule 702,334 as testimony based on the general knowledge of an
investigation. Because under this approach general knowledge will not be a
sufficient basis for lay opinion testimony, officers again will need to show
more specific first-hand knowledge to testify as a layperson. As a whole,
the categories will help to guarantee that only those who possess specific,
identifiable first-hand knowledge of an event are allowed to offer testimony
about its significance, resulting in fairer trials with less prejudicial
testimony.
Further, the interpretation of Rule 701(b) outlined in Garcia should be
the controlling interpretation. Most importantly, the Second Circuit in
Garcia explains that lay opinion testimony cannot simply summarize
admitted testimony.335 While Rule 701’s Advisory Committee note already
supports this point,336 the principle must be adhered to more strictly, as
done in Garcia. If complete evidence is already before the jury, an officer
must not be permitted to unnecessarily offer opinions, which do little more
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United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1123 (11th Cir. 2011).
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than unduly influence the jurors to agree with the prosecution’s case.337 A
complete bar on this form of testimony should be executed.
In an effort to avoid usurping the jury’s duties and to maintain the fairest
possible trial, all circuits should embrace the Second, Fourth, and Eighth
Circuits’ approaches to Rule 701.
CONCLUSION
As the influence of the common law has waned, the role of lay opinion
testimony in the American court system has significantly increased.338
Generally, this change has been positive, responding to the obvious
problems that a strict fact-opinion distinction created.339 Indeed, lay
opinion testimony provides the jury with a clearer understanding of what
occurred in a given situation and, therefore, helps the jury properly
determine disputed facts.340 However, the existence of Rule 701 in and of
itself demonstrates that lay opinion testimony must have a limit of some
kind. Because of Rule 701’s fairly vague wording, judges possess great
discretion to determine the admissibility of lay testimony that lies within the
Rule’s gray areas.341 In each situation, judges must determine whether the
lay witness possesses sufficient “perception” of the situation, as well as
whether the testimony is “helpful” to the trier of fact.342
However, the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have strayed
too far from the original meaning and purpose of Rule 701. Their
approaches have allowed unqualified and unnecessary testimony from law
enforcement officers to reach jurors. At least where officer testimony is at
issue, the approaches of these four circuits need to be abandoned, and an
augmented version of the approaches of the Second, Fourth, and Eighth
Circuits should be embraced. These three circuits have placed meaningful
limitations on officers’ lay opinion testimony, generally striking the
appropriate balance between allowing the jury to hear testimony and
preventing witnesses from usurping the jury’s function.

337. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text.
338. See Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1195 (3d Cir. 1995)
(explaining that Rule 701 demonstrates “a movement away from the courts’ historically
skeptical view of lay opinion evidence”).
339. See supra Part I.A.
340. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
341. See 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6253, at 116.
342. FED. R. EVID. 701.

